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 I !rst began to write about an idea I called “nation brand” in 1996. My original observation was a simple one: the 
reputations of countries (and, by extension, of cities and regions too) behave rather like the brand images of companies and 
products, and they are equally critical to the progress, prosperity, and good management of those places. 
 Unfortunately, the phrase “nation brand” soon became distorted, mainly by naïve governments in willing collusion 
with ambitious consulting !rms, into “nation branding,” a dangerously misleading phrase which seems to contain a promise 
that the images of countries can be directly manipulated using the techniques of commercial marketing communications. Yet 
despite repeatedly calling for it over the last !"een years, I have never seen a shred of evidence to suggest that this is possible: 
no case studies, no research, and not even any very persuasive arguments. I conclude that countries are judged by what they 
do, not by what they say, as they have always been; yet the notion that a country can simply advertise its way into a better 
reputation has proved to be a pernicious and surprisingly resilient one. 
 I also have to admit that despite studying the topic for many years, I’m not at all sure I even know what “branding” 
is. “Brand” can mean at least three di#erent things in the world of commerce: !rst, it can refer to the designed identity of 
a product (the look of the product itself, its packaging, its logo, its livery, its communications, and so forth); second, it is 
sometimes used more ambitiously to refer to the culture of the organisation behind the product; and third, it can refer to the 
product’s or corporation’s reputation in the minds of its target audience (this is the sense in which I used the word in my !rst
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essay on the subject in 1998, Nation Brands of the Twenty-First Century1, although the term “brand image” is a more precise 
one in this context).  
 Hence, one might suppose, “branding” must be related to one or another of these meanings: it is either the business 
of designing the livery of products (which is indeed what branding agencies do); or else it has something to do with building 
or creating an enhanced sense of corporate culture or mission within the organisation (in fact the word is not o!en used in 
this context); or it is the means by which the product acquires its reputation, and this is where the trouble starts. 
 Used in its "rst sense, branding actually does have some relevance to countries and the ways they present themselves 
to the rest of the world, but it is a humdrum business, which doesn’t begin to justify the excitement about “nation branding.” 
Countries, through their many state agencies, have numerous dealings with various professional audiences around the world, 
and one can certainly argue that it gives a better impression of the country if all those agencies use consistent, well-designed 
materials when they carry out their transactions. A single logo, a professional “look and feel” on their stationery, business 
cards, corporate videos, information lea#ets, communiqués, press releases, websites, and so forth, undoubtedly reinforces 
the impression of a well-organised, modern, self-respecting state with e$ective and e%cient structures, processes, and 
mechanisms.
 If this is nation branding then I withdraw all my objections: it’s an eminently sensible, perfectly achievable standard 
to which to aspire; all countries should try to do it well; and it’s certainly as important as, for example, making sure that 
diplomats o$er the right kinds of canapés when entertaining foreign heads of state; but it’s hard to understand why anybody in 
their right mind would want to spend time theorizing about it, still less write books about it. 
 &e point is that branding in this sense of the term is essentially a passive operation. It can’t win any new customers, 
change anybody’s mind, increase market share, or a$ect the country’s prospects in any signi"cant way. It is simply good 
practice, a useful exercise of reassurance, a piece of housekeeping.
 Certainly, for low-cost, fast-moving consumer products in a busy retail environment, the branding (in this sense 
of graphic design or corporate identity) can be almost as important as the product itself, because design is one of the few 
things that distinguishes a product from its competitors; the attractiveness of the product and its wrapper may even be a more 
signi"cant driver of consumer choice than advertising. &is is why branding agencies, accustomed to the emphasis placed on 
brand identity in their native "eld of commerce, talk so impressively about such matters, and public o%cials are o!en swayed 
by their talk. But countries aren’t for sale, aren’t easily mistaken one for another, aren’t fast-moving consumer goods, and 
certainly don’t come in wrappers, so the principles simply don’t transfer. 
 &e real confusion starts when people want branding to mean a technique, or set of techniques, by means of which 
brand image is directly built or enhanced: “Nike’s fantastic brand image is the result of fantastic branding.” It is not. Nike’s 
fantastic brand image is the result of fantastic products sold in fantastically large numbers. Brand building is primarily 
achieved through product development and marketing and has relatively little to do with branding (except, as I mentioned 
before, if branding means logo and packaging design; in which case, it certainly helps the marketing process along). If people 
buy a product and "nd it good, this will begin to create a powerful brand image for the product; the product will earn a 
good reputation. &is reputation gradually spreads to non-users; even people who haven’t bought the product will know that 
it’s a good product. &e reputation spreads, drives up sales, and increases the value of the corporation. It’s one of the most 
signi"cant factors of business success. 
 But the use of the term branding to imply a method for building brand equity is both incorrect and unjusti"able— 
there is simply no such method. Good products and services produced by a good corporation acquire a positive brand image, 
which eventually re#ects on the corporation and becomes its principal asset. Similarly, good products, services, culture, 
tourism, investments, technology, education, businesses, people, policies, initiatives, and events produced by a good country 
also acquire a positive brand image, which eventually re#ects on the country, and perhaps also becomes its principal asset. 
 &e message is clear: if a country is serious about enhancing its international image, it should concentrate on product 
development and marketing rather than chase a!er the chimera of branding. &ere are no short cuts. Only a consistent, 
coordinated, and unbroken stream of useful, noticeable, world-class, and above all relevant ideas, products, and policies can, 
gradually, enhance the reputation of the country that produces them. 
 I have o!en summarised this process as consisting of three main components: strategy, substance, and symbolic 
actions.2
 Strategy, in its simplest terms, is knowing who a nation is and where it stands today (both in reality and according to 
internal and external perceptions); knowing where it wants to get to; and knowing how it is going to get there. &e two main 
di%culties associated with strategy development are 1) reconciling the needs and desires of a wide range of di$erent national 
actors into a more or less single direction and 2) "nding a strategic goal that is both inspiring and feasible, since these two 
requirements are frequently contradictory.
1  Simon Anholt, “Nation-Brands of the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Brand Management 5, no. 6 (London: Henry Stewart Publications, 1998): 395-406.
2   Simon Anholt, Places: Identity, Image and Reputation (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
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 Substance is the e!ective execution of that strategy in the form of new economic, legal, political, social, cultural, and 
educational activity: the real innovations, businesses, legislation, reforms, investments, institutions, and policies which will 
bring about the desired progress. 
 Symbolic actions are a particular species of substance that happen to have an intrinsic communicative power: they 
might be innovations, structures, legislation, reforms, investments, institutions, or policies that are especially suggestive, 
remarkable, memorable, picturesque, newsworthy, topical, poetic, touching, surprising, or dramatic. Most importantly, they 
are emblematic of the strategy: they are at the same time a component of the national story and the means of telling it. 
Some good examples of symbolic actions are the Slovenian government donating "nancial aid to their Balkan neighbours in 
order to prove that Slovenia wasn’t part of the Balkans; Spain legalising single-sex marriages in order to demonstrate that its 
values had modernised to a point diametrically opposed to the Franco period; the decision of the Irish government to exempt 
artists, writers, and poets from income tax in order to prove the state’s respect for creative talent; Estonia declaring internet 
access to be a human right; or Bhutan charging a he#y "ne to visitors in order to demonstrate its great respect for its own 
cultural identity and for the fragility of its environment. 
 A single symbolic action will seldom achieve any lasting e!ect. Multiple actions should emanate from as many 
di!erent sectors as possible in order to build a rounded and believable image for the place; they must also continue in 
unbroken succession for many years. Symbolic actions should never be empty—they must be communicative substance rather 
than just communication. I argue that governments should never do things purely for brand-related reasons; no action should 
ever be conceived of or dedicated to image management or image change alone. Every initiative and action should "rst and 
foremost be done for a real purpose in the real world, or else it runs the risk of being insincere, ine!ective, and perceived as 
propaganda (not to mention a use of taxpayers’ money that is o#en extremely hard to justify). 
 It is clear that places require new and dedicated structures to coordinate, conceive, develop, maintain, and promote 
such an unbroken chain of proof. None of the traditional apparatus of trade or government is "t for such a purpose.
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 In order to sidestep the terminal confusion surrounding the notion of brands, I coined the deliberately unsexy term 
“competitive identity,” as the title of a book on this subject in 2007.3 It probably compromised sales of the book, but it made the 
point that national image has more to do with national identity and the politics and economics of competitiveness than with 
branding as it is usually understood in the commercial sector (or as is usually meant by people who know nothing about it). 
Today, every place on earth appears to want to enhance, reverse, adapt, or otherwise manage its international reputation. 
Yet we are still far from a widespread understanding of what this means in practice and just how far commercial approaches 
can be e!ectively and responsibly applied to government, society, and economic development. Many governments, most 
consultants, and even some scholars persist in a tiresome and super"cial interpretation of “place branding” that is nothing 
more than standard product promotion, public relations, and corporate identity, where the product just happens to be a 
country, a city, or a region rather than a tin of beans or a box of soap powder.
 $e need for proper understanding in this area is crucial. Today, the world is one market. $e rapid advance of 
globalisation means that whatever countries try to pull in (investors, aid, tourists, business visitors, students, major events, 
researchers, travel writers, and talented entrepreneurs) and whatever countries try to push out (products, services, policies, 
culture, and ideas) is done so with a discount if the country’s image is weak or negative and at a premium if it’s strong and 
positive. 
 In this crowded global marketplace, most people and organisations don’t have time to learn much about other places. 
We all navigate through the complexity of the modern world armed with a few simple clichés, and they form the background 
of our opinions, even if we aren’t fully aware of this and don’t always admit it to ourselves: Paris is about style; Japan about 
technology; Switzerland about wealth and precision; Rio de Janeiro about carnival and football; Tuscany about the good life; 
and most African nations about poverty, corruption, war, famine, and disease. Most of us are much too busy worrying about 
ourselves and our own countries to spend too long trying to form complete, balanced, and informed views about six billion 
other people and nearly two hundred other countries. We make do with summaries for the vast majority of people and places 
– the ones we will probably never know or visit – and only start to expand and re"ne these impressions when for some reason 
we acquire a particular interest in them. When you haven’t got time to read a book, you judge it by its cover.
 $ese clichés and stereotypes—positive or negative, true or untrue—fundamentally a!ect our behaviour towards 
other places and their people and products. It may seem unfair, but there’s nothing anybody can do to change this. It’s very 
hard for a country to persuade people in other parts of the world to go beyond these simple images and start to understand the 
rich complexity that lies behind them. Some quite progressive places don’t get nearly as much attention, visitors, business, or
3  Simon Anholt, Competitive Identity: !e New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
!"#$%&'()"&*
3
Anholt: Nation Brand
Published by SURFACE, 2013
!
investment as they need because their reputation is weak or negative, while others are still trading on a good image that they 
acquired decades or even centuries ago and today do relatively little to deserve. 
 So all responsible governments, on behalf of their people, their institutions, and their companies, need to measure 
and monitor the world’s perception of their nation and to develop a strategy for managing it. It is a key part of their job to try 
to earn a reputation that is fair; true; powerful; attractive; genuinely useful to their economic, political, and social aims; and 
honestly re!ective of the spirit, the genius, and the will of the people. "is huge task has become one of the primary skills of 
administrations in the twenty-#rst century.
 When it comes into o$ce, a government inherits a sacred responsibility for its electorate’s most valuable asset: the 
good name of its country. Its task is to hand that good name down to its successors in at least as good condition as it received 
it. 
"#$%&'($%)*%+),$'
 President Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic of Korea is one leader who appears to have taken this responsibility 
seriously and has identi#ed the task of improving South Korea’s rather weak performance in the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation 
Brands Index™ (NBI) as a particularly important challenge for the country’s future success and prosperity. 
 South Korea is an interesting case. "is is a country which, by any account, has made remarkable progress during the 
last three decades, achieving great advances in prosperity, stability, transparency, productivity, education, and in many other 
important areas. "e ‘Korean Wave’ of high-quality #lm, music and television has made Korea into something of a media 
star in East and South-East Asia, yet its image remains decidedly weak, if not actually negative, outside the region. Research 
suggests that people in many countries aren’t even quite sure which of the two Koreas is the good one and which the bad one— 
or whether perhaps they are both bad. 
 "e reason why Korea has a weak international image is not, of course, because it has spent too little money on 
promoting itself. It’s because most people in most other countries simply aren’t interested in Korea, any more than they are 
interested in Peru, Jordan, Estonia, or Namibia. And there is, currently, no compelling reason why they should be. 
 Most people in most countries aren’t even very interested in their own country, let alone the two hundred or so other 
countries around the world. "ey are interested in their own lives, their own families, their own neighbourhood. Perhaps 
they sometimes think about America or China or Afghanistan or some other country that’s regularly in the news. Perhaps 
they occasionally give a thought to their neighbouring countries, another country where friends or relatives live, or another 
country they would like to visit one day as tourists or migrant workers or students. But the idea that large numbers of people 
in Europe, the Americas, South Asia or anywhere else would spend time thinking about South Korea is, at least at the moment, 
merely fantasy. 
 Korea could spend a hundred billion or a trillion won on promoting its image, and it still wouldn’t make itself 
relevant to the daily lives of foreigners. "e cutest logo in the world can’t make people admire a country that has no relevance 
to them: governments might as well burn the money. 
 Tourism promotion—it should be stressed—is a di%erent matter. "is is primarily about selling a product to a 
consumer, rather than trying to change people’s minds about a country, and advertising is a legitimate and proven method to 
achieve this. 
 In one sense, despite all the mystique and complexity surrounding the concept of nation branding, the basic principle 
is actually a very simple one, and it comes from marketing: the consumer wants to know “what’s in it for me?” At this basic 
level, it is clear that a country’s achievements for its own population, its successes and its prosperity, will never automatically 
result in any kind of enhanced reputation, simply because they don’t bene#t the (foreign) consumer. 
 I was consequently all the more delighted to hear See-jeong Chang, Director of the Korea International Cooperation 
Agency, announce at the Jeju Peace Forum in 2009 that it was Korea’s intention to increase its overseas development assistance 
to 0.25% of GNI by 2015. "is means that Korea is still a long way from joining the tiny club of nations that have met the 
United Nation’s recommendation of 0.7% of GNI, but it is certainly better than either the United States or Japan have achieved 
in recent years. Clearly a country can’t simply buy itself a better reputation by spending more money on poverty reduction, but 
the voluntary increase is a powerful symbolic gesture that Korea is ready and prepared to start making a serious contribution 
to the issues that matter to humanity—and not just to Koreans. 
&),-),'.$%/)01'2%3$(-)4(15121.6%*),%&)74.,1$(8
 So if a country wants to be admired, it must be relevant, and in order to become relevant, it must participate usefully, 
productively, and imaginatively in the global conversations on the topics that matter to people elsewhere and everywhere. 
"e list of those topics is a long one: climate change, poverty, famine, narcotics, migration, economic stability, human rights, 
women’s rights, indigenous people’s rights, children’s rights, religious and cultural tolerance, nuclear proliferation, water, 
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education, corruption, terrorism, crime, war, and arms control are just a few of the most obvious ones. It’s hard to imagine any 
country that couldn’t pick at least one item on this list with a special relevance to its own needs or resources and !nd a way to 
make a prominent, thoughtful, meaningful, and memorable contribution to the debate and to the global e"ort. 
 #ere is a strong precedent for this kind of behaviour in the commercial world. For the past twenty years or so, it has 
become more and more evident that corporations that fail to demonstrate and maintain high ethical standards, transparency, 
and social responsibility will soon lose the trust and respect of their consumers. 
 #e critics of corporate social responsibility claim that the approach has become devalued because, in many cases, it 
is no more than window-dressing. But, in the face of such attempts at free-riding, the media and consumers naturally tend to 
increase scrutiny and demand higher standards, reducing the opportunities for corporations to get away with greenwash or 
empty propaganda. Corporations are at last being forced to treat their social responsibilities as a matter for the board rather 
than for the PR agency. Surely the basic principle here is no di"erent from the one I underlined earlier in this chapter: in order 
to achieve a better reputation, as Socrates is said to have observed, we must endeavour to be as we desire to appear. In other 
words, it is necessary to provide people with proof of one’s virtues. If the price of consumer respect is continuous and tangible 
evidence of corporate responsibility rather than pious statements, so much the better for everyone. 
 But if one is cynical and believes that 75 percent of organisations that preach the triple bottom line are merely 
window-dressing, still, the fact that a quarter of all those companies have fundamentally reviewed the ways, means, causes, 
and e"ects of doing business, and have cleaned up their act as a result, is revolutionary. 
 What a revolution it would be if countries, cities, and regions, nowadays as obsessed with the value of their 
reputations as companies are, were to follow the same principles. 
 It is already clear from the Nation Brands Index data that more and more people in more and more countries feel 
unable to admire or respect countries or governments that pollute the planet, practise or permit corruption, trample human 
rights, or $out the rule of law: in other words, it’s the same audience starting to apply the same standards to countries as they 
apply to companies. 
 In just a few decades, consumer power has changed the rules of business and transformed the behaviour of 
corporations almost beyond recognition. It doesn’t seem unreasonable to hope that consumer power might achieve a similar 
transformation in the way that countries, cities, and regions are run in the years to come.  
#$%&'()*%'+,-)$./)*0+1/
 
 #e potential gains from pursuing ethical policies are of course matched by the corresponding risks of failing to 
pursue them. Italy, for example, has the sixth best national image in the world, according to the Nation Brands Index, coming 
up top for tourism and second for culture. Its ranking is only let down by rather poor scores for business and governance, as 
one might perhaps expect. 
 And yet there is a worrying undercurrent when one looks more closely at Italy’s rankings over the last few years. Not 
only is it the most volatile of any Top 10 country in the Index, but it is also in steady decline. Italy’s rankings have dropped 
by 2.3% since the questionnaire of the Nation Brands Index was stabilised in the last quarter of 2005—which may not sound 
much, but at this rate Italy will have a weaker image than Mexico in ten years’ time.
 It seems pretty clear that Italy’s brand is not actually declining in absolute terms. #e reason why Italy’s NBI scores 
are falling so fast is because the world is changing its mind on a number of issues, and Italy is being very gradually “squeezed 
out” of the new scenario. As the Nation Brands Index has abundantly proved over the years, country images are normally 
remarkably stable, and barely change from year to year. What Italy seems to be facing is not a loss of attraction in its image, but 
a decline in the relevance of that image for many people: in other words, Italy seems to be going out of fashion.
 Tellingly, one of the areas where Italy is increasingly failing to make a connection with global public opinion is in the 
area of its environmental standards and commitment: worse than being perceived as just another country that isn’t doing very 
much about climate change, it is perceived as a country with a hugely important natural and cultural heritage that isn’t doing 
enough to look a%er it. 
 Italy isn’t the only country whose image is su"ering as a result of such a perception; it drags down China’s and 
America’s images too (and China’s image is dragged down even more markedly by its weak scores for governance and human 
rights). America’s scores in most areas have improved dramatically since President Obama took o&ce, but it remains to be 
seen whether this blip of hope will prove durable or not. 
 Are we observing the !rst victims of a consumer power revolution? It is, of course, too early to say; but there is no 
question that international public opinion is beginning to emerge as a formidable new player in the complex equation of 
international relations and sovereign power.
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 !e fundamental problem of sovereignty is that national leaders, assuming they care about public opinion at all, care 
most about the opinions of their own populations; even if they aren’t elected leaders, this is simple self-interest. And when 
their national interest is at odds with the national interest of other states, governments will invariably focus on pleasing their 
electorate at the expense of pleasing foreign populations; indeed, populist politicians such as Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and 
Hugo Chávez sometimes rely on displeasing certain foreign publics in order to enhance their domestic appeal.  
 But it may not be too naïve to hope that things are slowly changing, and the paradox may be starting to resolve itself. 
As more and more of the issues that governments face today cut across national sovereignty (of the long list of important 
topics which I mentioned earlier, from climate change to arms control, none are respecters of national boundaries), as national 
governments are held more and more to account by their own populations for these shared challenges, as those populations 
feel more and more closely connected through shared issues with populations in other countries, it becomes harder for leaders 
to pursue radically di"erent agendas from those of the international community. !e tragedy of the commons may not, a#er 
all, be destined to be a tragedy forever. 
 A kind of common morality shapes the (very rough) boundaries of what is deemed acceptable behaviour in most 
parts of the world today. A morality characterised by human rights, environmentalism, the rule of law, anti-colonialism, 
democracy, and free market economics; whilst the universality of these values is, quite rightly, under constant scrutiny and 
discussion, there is no denying a sense of basic consensus on at least some of the principal ones. !e governments today that 
appear not to mind being regarded as moral outsiders by international public opinion, or who don’t see the need to maintain a 
positive national image, can almost be counted on the $ngers of two hands. 
 Acquiring the support, or at least avoiding the censure, of public opinion in other countries is also driven by the 
emergence of more and more regional and multilateral groupings. Most governments of E.U. member states, for example, 
would prefer to avoid incurring public disapproval elsewhere in the European Union if they can help it, since it reduces 
their ability to support their own country’s interests, and similar e"ects occur within other multilateral clubs such as NATO, 
ASEAN and MERCOSUR. 
 For developing countries that are dependent on foreign aid, being seen as worthy recipients of that aid is an essential 
precondition of their continuing to receive it; donor governments cannot long continue to donate their taxpayers’ money to 
regimes or countries with very weak or very negative brand images. !e willingness of China to extend enormous amounts of 
aid without regard to such matters has considerably upset the delicate moral balance in this area; but there are signs that the 
same mechanisms are, gradually, having the e"ect of bringing China into line with the views of the moral majority too – for, 
of course, China itself depends on the approval of international public opinion in order to maintain the health of its all-
important exports. 
 One way or another, it seems that governments $nd international public approval ever more worth their while to 
value, to seek, and to retain, and the mechanism of shared values and reciprocal esteem appears to function better with each 
decade that passes. Just as in the corporate sphere, earning and maintaining a good reputation is becoming the cost of entry 
into the marketplace; survival outside that marketplace is no longer an option.
4/5#%67%8**)
 So the last thing, it seems to me, most countries should want is a brand. If a brand image is the catchy reduction of 
something rich and complex into a simple, naive, one-dimensional formula, then many of the countries which already have 
one would probably do better to get rid of it. Nation branding is surely the problem, not the solution: branding is what the 
media and public opinion do to countries, not what governments should try to do to their own states and populations. What 
countries need is for people around the world to have a richer, deeper, more complex, more nuanced, more democratic, more 
chaotic, more human view of their land, their population and their civilisation—not a fabricated stereotype to replace the 
inherited stereotype. 
 Why else did Egyptian respondents’ scores for Denmark drop thirty-six places in the Nation Brands Index following 
the publication of a handful of cartoons, while their scores for America never fell further than six, despite the invasion and 
military occupation of two Muslim countries? Because Denmark had a simple brand image, while America moved beyond 
a brand centuries ago. Most Egyptians only knew one thing about Denmark—that it was a Scandinavian country—so they 
admired it; then they learned one new thing—that it had insulted their Prophet—so $#y percent of its image became negative, 
and they hated it. By contrast, Egyptians knew thousands of things about America, so one new negative fact only formed a 
small proportion of the whole, and in%icted only limited damage on this very large idea. 
 What most countries should be attempting is surely more like education than branding: to $nd ways of helping 
people in other countries to get to know them, to increase and celebrate rather than reduce their own complexity. !is is one 
reason why I have claimed that cultural relations is the only demonstrably e"ective form of nation branding I have ever
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encountered. !e experience of countries that have successfully practised cultural relations over many years shows that 
consistent, imaginative cultural exchange does eventually create an environment where respect and tolerance "ourish, and 
this undoubtedly also favours increased trade in skills, knowledge, products, capital, and people. People who understand each 
other tend to get on better, and people who get on better tend to trade with each other more frequently, more freely and with 
greater mutual pro#t. 
 I remember hearing about a study carried out in Iraq some years a$er the United States/United Kingdom invasion, in 
which young Iraqis were questioned about their attitudes towards the presence of British soldiers in Baghdad: some 99 percent 
of those interviewed expressed strong antipathy to their presence, but 1% had much more favourable views. It turned out that 
this 1 percent corresponded almost exactly to individuals who had used the British Council Library in Baghdad. If you know 
people through understanding and sharing their culture, it’s hard to hate them. You can sometimes hate what they do, but 
that’s in#nitely easier to deal with and to recover from.
 Of course, extending the reach of the cultural relations e%ect beyond the unavoidably limited number of individuals 
that the country’s cultural centres can engage with directly is a challenge. It’s slow work, one individual at a time, and requires 
enormous numbers of highly trained and highly dedicated people to achieve. 
 One of the most important aspects of cultural relations is that cultural promotion is never entirely satisfactory 
either for the sender or the receiver. Nobody likes having another nation’s cultural habits or achievements thrust upon their 
attention: what the British Council has learned to stress over the last eighty years is the importance of mutuality. 
 !is principle is based on the observation that people who like culture like to engage in culture, so rather than being 
expected to admire another nation’s culture, it is much more rewarding, much more exciting, and much more e%ective for two 
nations to do culture together. Engagement is invariably more productive than promotion; listening an indispensable adjunct 
to talking; and if you want something from somebody, it is only reasonable to ask what they want from you. 
 Such groundwork is the essential, indispensible, and irreplaceable means of resolving, avoiding, and mitigating 
hatred and ignorance between peoples. Where culture is the problem, culture is also the solution. !is seems to me so much 
safer and more valuable a way of increasing understanding between nations than the rather risky game of reducing a country’s 
history, culture, and population to an infantile stereotype, and then discharging it at other nations as if from a gun. 
 You will have your di%erences with other cultures, of course, but against a background of ignorance those di%erences 
will #nd their expression in protectionism and isolation at best; an indoctrination, hatred, and violence at worst. Against a 
background of understanding and respect, di%erences remain harmless mysteries at worst and the source of highly fruitful 
relationships at best—the mingling of opposites and the chaos of cultural diversity being the most creative and productive 
power on earth.  
 As I wrote in an article in 2006, “if the world’s governments placed even half the value which most wise corporations 
have learned to place on their good names, the world would be a safer and quieter place than it is today.”4  I think we have reason 
to feel hopeful that this dynamic, notwithstanding the almost chronic pessimism of the commentariat today, is starting to 
make things better.
4  Simon Anholt, “Anholt-GMI Nation Brands Index,” 2006 Q4 General Report, 2006, www.nationbrandsindex.com.
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